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Introduction
Gender justice remains unfinished business. How is family law, in particular the
relationship between civil and religious family law, relevant to the challenge of
securing gender justice both in the United States and around the globe? This
question has received comparatively little attention when measured against
the by-now voluminous literature on whether multiculturalism and feminism
(and sex equality) are in conflict, as well as on how constitutional democracies should accommodate members of minority groups, including religious
minorities, within their borders. It should receive more, for as some feminist
contributors to this literature explain, family life and family law are arenas in
which women may experience special vulnerabilities and where commitments
to religious freedom and to sex equality may conflict.1 How do constitutional
democracies regulate family life and allocate jurisdiction over family law in a
way that honors important public values and shows respect for citizens — and
other members of the polity — who have multiple sources of affiliation, including to religious communities whose norms shape family life?2
In recent years, controversies over veiling are perhaps the most visible example of an evident clash between religious norms and civil norms of sex
equality. What is at stake, for example, when women and girls in constitutional
democracies are barred, in the name of constitutional values and democratic
principles such as secularism, neutrality, and gender equality, from wearing
the veil in certain public settings? What happens when such restrictions seem
to disregard women’s agency and conscientious religious practice? Barring
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women from veiling contrasts with another potent example of the apparent
clash between sex equality and religion: the specter, in some Islamic countries,
of forced veiling and punishments exacted on women for not veiling or violating norms of modesty.
The multiple meanings of the veil continue to engender political and scholarly debate.3 The most dramatic recent examples of the apparent clash between
sex equality as a political value and veiling as a religious commitment come
from France. As Joan Scott, in her study of the veiling controversy in France,
observed, one prominent rationale for targeting the veil is its symbolic clash
with sex equality: in “removing the sign of women’s inequality from the classroom,” French lawmakers were “declaring that the equality of women and
men is the first principle of the Republic.”4 One notable news story was of the
denial of citizenship to a veiled Muslim woman, Faiza Silmi, on the grounds
of “insufficient” assimilation to French values.5 Mary Anne Case points out,
however, that although the press reports made it seem as though the mere fact
of Silmi’s wearing a niqab barred her from citizenship, and her lawyers framed
the issue as a clash between her religious practices and the French value of laicite, “the record highlights ‘in particular the equality of the sexes’ as one of ‘the
essential values of the French community’ she had failed ‘to make her own.’”6
In June of 2009, in a remarkable “state of the nation” speech, President
Sarkozy, in effect, declared war on the burka, asserting that “in our country we
cannot accept that women be prisoners behind a screen, cut off from all social
life, deprived of all identity.”7 Again, the symbol itself seemed an affront to
French values: “The burka is not a religious sign. . . . It is a sign of subservience,
a sign of debasement. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic.”8 Somewhat contradictorily, he also called for a “debate” on the issue in
which “[a]ll views must be expressed,” while admonishing Parliament that “we
must not be ashamed of our values, we must not be afraid of defending them.”9
Closer to home here in North America, a stated concern both with loss — or
concealment — of identity and with the evident clash between veiling and a
message of equality between women and men featured in the recent call by
the Canadian Muslim Congress for the Ottawan government to ban women
wearing the burka and niqab in public. The Congress further contended that
such practices are rooted in culture, rather than religion.10
Another arena of evident conflict between religious law and practice and
civic norms of sex equality is the relationship between religious and civil famMcClain · Marriage, Family Law, & Sex Equality · 77
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ily law, even though it less frequently spills into news headlines. This is the
subject of my chapter. Pressing questions include the respective jurisdiction
of religious and civil courts, whether religious law should be accommodated
in civil courts, and how pluralistic or multicultural a society should be when
it comes to regulating the family. One area of tension is between terms of religious family law that seem to be patriarchal and diverge from secular family
law’s principles of gender neutrality and equal spousal and parental rights and
responsibilities. As with the veiling controversy, religious family law can take
on symbolic importance as an arena of troubling sex inequality. So, too, with
the contrast between restricting versus compelling veiling, women’s agency
may be at stake both in civil rules, on the one hand, that bar them from resorting to religious tribunals or seeking civil enforcement of religious family law
and, on the other, that consign them to such tribunals at the expense of access
to civil courts and the remedies afforded by civil family law.11
The challenging question of the relationship between religious and civil
family law received international attention when, on February 7, 2008, the
archbishop of Canterbury gave what proved to be a controversial lecture on
civil and religious law in England. He explained that his aim was “to tease out
some of the broader issues around the rights of religious groups within a secular
state, with a few thought[s] about what might be entailed in crafting a just
and constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the
United Kingdom.”12 In this lecture, he explained that within Britain, there are
communities “which, while no less law-abiding than the rest of the population,
relate to something other than the British legal system alone.” Noting that
this issue is not peculiar to Islam, but also about other faith groups, he used
the example of the place of Muslims in British society as a way to open up the
discussion to wider issues about the uncertainty over “what degree of accommodation the law of the land can and should give to minority communities
with their own strongly entrenched legal and moral codes.”13
Other contributors to this volume make reference to the archbishop’s lecture. I note it here, as they do, to suggest the prominence given in recent years
to the question of the relationship between civil and religious law. It also usefully presents in a highly public — and publicized — way how this relationship raises issues about the meaning, rights, and protections of citizenship,
especially women’s equal citizenship, and the meaning of and sources constituting individual and group identity. The swift reaction to the archbishop’s
78 · Ethics of Recognizing Religious Family Law
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remarks — including calls for his resignation — suggests how fraught these
issues are and how readily fears of “extreme applications of Shariah . . . in
some Muslim countries”14 make serious conversation about accommodation
and legal pluralism difficult.
After the archbishop’s speech, press coverage in the United States opened, as
it were, a window for readers into a world of “Islamic justice,” in which Islamic
tribunals or councils hear divorce cases.15 One news story details that Islamic
councils in Britain have expanded significantly and seen a large increase in cases
and that “almost all of the cases involved women asking for divorce.” Women’s
success in their cases is tempered by expression of concerns about their vulnerability under this system. Critics “point to cases of domestic violence in which
Islamic scholars have tried to keep marriages together by ordering husbands to
take classes in anger management, leaving the wives so intimidated that they
have withdrawn their complaints from the police.”16 A founding director of a
women’s help group, Fatima Women’s Network, charges that such women are
“hostages to fortune” and says of the courts, “There is no outside monitoring,
no protection, no records kept, no guarantee that justice will prevail.”17 That
one source of protection is the woman’s father seems, from a feminist point
of view, simply to highlight this vulnerability.
This news story reveals a form of legal pluralism — side by side civil courts,
there are religious courts in Britain granting religious divorce. It also raises
the issue of religious women’s agency and vulnerability. Increasingly, women
seek out these courts to obtain a religious divorce when their husbands do
not want one; and yet, the patriarchal aspects of this system are evident in
descriptions of the greater weight given to the women’s father’s testimony than
hers and the fact that it is (apparently) solely male scholars who sit in these
councils or tribunals. Moreover, there are glimpses of ways in which religious
law itself favors men over women. Women’s very recourse to these tribunals
stems from the fact that a “woman needs the blessing of a scholar of Islamic
jurisprudence to be divorced, while a man can simply say three times that he
is divorcing his wife.”18
Finally, the news story introduces the complicated issue of the relationship
between civil and religious authority: religious divorces are not civil divorces,
and “most of the [Islamic] courts’ judgments have no standing under British
civil law.” This does not mean that all religious tribunals in Britain lack capacity to issue rulings with civilly binding effects. Longstanding are ecclesiastical
McClain · Marriage, Family Law, & Sex Equality · 79
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courts of the Church of England and beth din courts for British Jews. Because
they comply with Britain’s arbitration law, the latter courts can function as an
“official court of arbitration in the consensual resolution of other civil disputes,
like inheritance or business conflicts.” The story implies that Islamic councils
could do the same thing but notes the potential for a clash between principles
of civil law and religious law and the supremacy of British law in such a conflict. Thus, the British justice minister explains this latitude: “There is nothing
whatever in English law that prevents people abiding by Shariah principles if
they wish to, provided they do not come into conflict with English law;” but
British law would “always remain supreme.” He further states, “Regardless of
religious belief, we are all equal before the law.”19
As these stories from France and Britain illustrate, this issue of family law
jurisdiction lends itself to many different framings of what is at stake in these
conflicts. One is the struggle of minority communities to preserve, identify,
and live according to their values. Another is a clash between religious and
civil norms about family life and the status of men and women in the family
and broader community. Another framing stresses the meaning of legal pluralism: How much sovereignty and authority should religious courts have in
a society with a secular legal system? Should civil courts give civil effects to
rulings of religious courts? Do civil courts have authority to adjudicate the
terms of a religious marriage contract? What happens when civil rules about
family dissolution conflict with those of religious law? Does, or should, secular
law — and its commitments to equality — “reign supreme”?
For the last few years, I have participated in an interdisciplinary scholarly
conversation (called “The Multi-tiered Marriage Project”) about whether
the United States should move toward a more robustly pluralistic system of
family law, in which civil courts more readily share jurisdiction with religious
courts.20 A basic premise of that project is that the United States could find
many instructive examples of such pluralism in other legal systems. While I
do not deny the value of learning from other legal systems, I argue that a substantial body of feminist work on those very legal systems urges caution about
transporting such models to the United States. In this chapter, I examine the
lure of pluralism and situate the call for more pluralism in the context of the
current system of U.S. family law. It may not be evident that, in the United
States, there is already a notable degree of intermingling of religious and civil
family law. I illustrate this by examining the interplay of civil and religious
80 · Ethics of Recognizing Religious Family Law
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marriage in the ongoing controversy over same-sex marriage. I also canvass
some of the ways that courts in the United States already do enforce religious
rulings and the terms of religious marriage contracts. At the same time, core
commitments of civil family law, including to sex equality, limit the extent of
such accommodation. To use the terms introduced in Martha Minow’s contribution to this volume, sometimes there is “convergence” between secular and
religious norms, and no evident “compromise” of principles.21 But sometimes,
courts must limit accommodation because they cannot compromise on core
family law principles. I conclude that a call for legal pluralism in the form of
a modern millet system in the United States clashes with basic political and
family law norms of sex equality.
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The Call for More Pluralism and
Shared Jurisdiction in U.S. Family Law
As Brian Tamanaha observes, “Legal pluralism is everywhere.”22 Not only
is there, “in every social arena one examines, a seeming multiplicity of legal
orders, from the lowest local level to the most expansive global level,” but in
the last few decades, legal pluralism itself “has become a major topic in legal
anthropology, legal sociology, comparative, law, international law, and socio-
legal studies.”23 But problems with defining and understanding legal pluralism
continue to “plague” its study.24
What of legal pluralism in family law? A common observation is that family law — and family law practice — in the United States have become global
due to “the globalization of the family.”25 As people who form families cross
geographic and national boundaries, lawyers and courts routinely must deal
with complex questions of jurisdiction and comity with respect to marriage,
divorce, child custody, and the like.
Has the time come, at the normative level, to embrace more legal pluralism
in family law within the United States? If so, what form should it take? To
answer these questions, clarifying what is meant by “legal pluralism” in family law is crucial. Broadly defined, legal pluralism acknowledges that there
are multiple sources of normative ordering in every society. Such sources
include not only the “official” legal system, embodied in civil cases, statutes,
and constitutions, but also, as Ann Estin describes, the “unofficial family law”
McClain · Marriage, Family Law, & Sex Equality · 81
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of religious tribunals, rules, customs, and the like.26 This “unofficial family law”
has a formative effect on persons and communities even if it is not buttressed
by binding state authority.
More narrowly defined, legal pluralism refers not to this broader normative
pluralism but to questions of jurisdiction and juridical power.27 Sally Engle
Merry explains that “state law” is “fundamentally different” than non-state
forms of ordering because “it exercises the coercive power of the state and
monopolizes the symbolic power associated with state authority.” She urges
that the study of legal pluralism attend to the interaction of state law with
these other forms of ordering.28
The Multi-tiered Marriage Project calls for a national conversation on this
interaction between state and non-state power with respect to jurisdiction over
marriage and divorce. To the “ought” question about whether there should
be more jurisdictional pluralism, it answers “yes.” Project convenor Professor
Joel Nichols, of St. Thomas University, proposes that, in the United States,
“civil government should consider ceding some of its jurisdictional authority
over marriage and divorce law to religious communities that are competent
and capable of adjudicating the marital rites and rights of their respective
adherents.”29 He finds, already within the United States, some forms of a
multi-tiered system: covenant marriage, available in three states, and New
York’s get statutes.30 In Louisiana, for example, key proponents of covenant
marriage self-consciously sought to instantiate a covenant model of marriage
in keeping with “God’s intended purpose for marriage.”31
To usher in more legal pluralism in the United States, Nichols proposes to
learn from other legal systems. He spins the globe and finds many instructive
ways to share jurisdiction over marriage and divorce law, such as multiple
systems of personal law, in which religious tribunals have jurisdiction (as in
India, Kenya, and Israel); legal recognition of customary marriage (as in South
Africa); and allowing religious bodies to arbitrate family law matters (an issue
of recent controversy in Ontario, Canada). 32
What form would a new jurisdictional pluralism in U.S. family law take?
Nichols proposes a “more robust millet system.”33 The analogy is to the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, in which personal law (including marriage)
was administered by religious tribunals, a system still operating to varying
degrees in some countries that Nichols canvasses. His model, which envisions
“semi-autonomous” religious entities and the state acting as the overarching
82 · Ethics of Recognizing Religious Family Law
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sovereign that intervenes only when basic minimum guidelines are not met,
seems to reject a model of complete autonomy of religious tribunals. However,
the reference to “basic minimum guidelines” suggests a thin supervisory role
for the state.
In this chapter, I will concede the descriptive point that “legal pluralism is
everywhere” and challenge — or at least raise cautions about — the normative
claim that there should be more of it in U.S. family law. An exercise in comparative law readily does reveal many different ways of allocating jurisdiction
over family law. This does not, however, answer the normative question of
whether these are good models for U.S. family law.
One normative concern over civil law ceding authority to religious and
other tribunals to regulate marriage and divorce regards the place of key commitments, values, and functions of civil family law. What authority will civil
government have in the modified system to advance family law’s functions of
protecting the best interests of children and other vulnerable parties? What
will happen if its model of marriage as an equal partnership premised on
gender-neutral and reciprocal (rather than complementary and hierarchical)
rights and duties conflicts with religious models? What will happen if there
is a gap between religious law on marital dissolution and civil law’s norm of
equitable distribution of marital property and rationales for spousal support?
Another pressing concern is whether such a millet system can adequately
protect the equal citizenship of women. I am skeptical that it can, for reasons
I elaborate below. Nearly every foreign example that Nichols offers of jurisdictional pluralism concerning family law raises troubling question about
how to reconcile sex equality with religious freedom.34 Feminist scholars
highlight the importance of “encultured women’s” claims of national and
constitutional citizenship — or “public citizenship” — as a strategy for redressing sex inequality, even as such women affirm the value of membership
in religious and cultural groups.35 Will a new jurisdictional pluralism accommodate this dual membership? Training a gender lens on the question
of jurisdictional pluralism would better inform a national conversation on
the subject.
Nichols assures readers that “[m]oving toward multi-tiered marriage” system is compatible with family law’s protective functions and with “core values
of equality.”36 But his international examples contradict this reassurance. They
call into question whether the proper model should be “ceding” authority or
McClain · Marriage, Family Law, & Sex Equality · 83
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recognizing plural forms of authority, but only subject to constitutional and
civil limiting principles. When government forms a partnership with religion,
we might contrast two competing models of this relationship: unleashing, in
the sense of turning loose or freeing; versus harnessing, in the sense of utilizing by yoking or restricting in light of important constitutional and public
values.37 This distinction between unleashing and harnessing may prove useful
when considering calls for shared, or multiple, jurisdiction.
Family law, to be sure, already allows persons to opt out, to some extent,
from its protective “default rules” through private ordering (such as premarital
agreements and arbitration). Thus, in assessing the demand for jurisdictional
pluralism, it is important to consider the place family law already accords to
individual choice and freedom of contract.
This chapter first asks precisely what form of marriage pluralism in the
United States is sought and what might be motivating this demand. It examines
differing views about the relationship between religious and civil marriage
and notes how public norms of sex equality in the family may be in tension
with religious traditions. It then examines some of the case law in which state
courts within the United States have dealt with religious and foreign family
law in resolving civil disputes about marriage and divorce. It asks what this
case law suggests about the prospects for a multi-tiered marriage law in the
United States and what tension points might arise. Finally, it concludes by
asking what lessons this might teach about the possibilities for more pluralism in U.S. family law.
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Whither the Demand for More Marriage
Pluralism in the United States?
An Initial Question: Should Religious
and Civil Family Law Be Congruent?
Is there a demand, within the United States, for “multi-tiered marriage”?
It may clarify matters to distinguish two types of demands for more legal
pluralism: First, particular religious communities might challenge the authority of the state to regulate marriage and argue either for sole or shared
authority. This demand could arise either from religious communities that
84 · Ethics of Recognizing Religious Family Law
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are long-established within the United States or, as a part of multicultural
accommodation, from newer immigrant religious communities. A solution
that Nichols floats is a millet system in which religious tribunals have jurisdictional autonomy with minimal state oversight. Second, religious communities
might express discontent with the substance of civil marriage law and desire
to instantiate, with more binding force in civil law, religious understandings
of marriage so that the two are congruent. If this latter strategy is preferred,
the question arises: which religious understandings? That of majority religious institutions? What place will there be for the many minority religions
practiced in America? And for minority views within the respective religious
traditions?
The political and legal battles over same-sex marriage seem to be one motivating factor in the demand for both forms of legal pluralism. One response to
the prospect of states redefining civil marriage to permit same-sex couples to
marry (as Massachusetts and now five other states have done) is to propose that
the state “get out of the marriage business” and leave it to religious institutions
to define and regulate marriage. Offering a “Judeo-Christian” argument for
“privatizing marriage,” legal scholar Daniel Crane proposes that civil law permit couples to make civil contracts assigning jurisdiction over their marriage
to religious authorities.38 That way, religious believers and institutions would
not cede the power to define marriage to the state. Edward Zelinsky offers a
different “pro-marriage case” for abolishing civil marriage: government should
shed its monopoly on marriage in favor of a “market for marriage” in which
civil marriage competes with other models of marriage offered by religious
and other sponsoring institutions.39
Given the role of religious understandings of marriage in opposition to extending civil marriage to same-sex couples, another way to clarify that religious
and civil marriage are distinct would be for states to cede the term “marriage”
to religious traditions and replace it with a new status like civil unions or civil
partnerships to which would attach various benefits and obligations now
linked to civil marriage.40 More typically, religious opponents of same-sex
marriage seek congruence between religious and civil law. Appeals to religious
tradition have animated efforts by religious institutions and lawmakers to
“defend” marriage by enshrining in state and federal constitutions a definition
of marriage as one man and one woman. The argument for congruence is that
if the legal definition of marriage is so altered that it no longer recognizes the
McClain · Marriage, Family Law, & Sex Equality · 85
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goods and purposes of marriage as understood in religious traditions, marriage
law will not rest on a true conception of marriage.41 A comparative example
may be found in Canada. After Parliament passed a law redefining marriage
as being “between two persons,” a group of religious leaders issued a “Declaration on Marriage” urging members of Parliament and Canadian citizens to
reconsider such redefinition because it severed marriage from its “nature and
purpose,” and faith communities could not promote an institution “when the
identifying language has been stripped of its real meaning.”42 These opponents
of redefining marriage seek greater congruence between religious and civil
marriage, not marriage pluralism.
Covenant marriage also reflects a congruence strategy: it harnesses state
power to instantiate an ideal of marriage in keeping with Christian traditions
about permanence and mutual sacrifice.43 An architect of Louisiana’s law,
Katherine Shaw Spaht, describes covenant marriage as a step toward a “robust
pluralism” in marriage and divorce law but also acknowledges that advocates of
covenant marriage statutes envisioned that if couples widely embraced it, the
paradigm would shift from no-fault to covenant marriage.44 (For this reason,
Spaht and some proponents of covenant marriage express disappointment
that religious authorities have not embraced it and required members to enter
into this model of marriage.)45 Moreover, requiring premarital counseling and
specifying that it may be performed by religious functionaries draw attention
to the unique capacity of religious communities to preserve marriages.46 Congruence is evident in Spaht’s argument that conceding a difference between
civil and religious marriage fails to recognize that “[n]atural moral law applies
equally to the religious and non-religious alike” and is accessible through the
exercise of reason.47
If covenant marriage is a way for religion to harness state power, the state
also harnesses — and does not simply unleash — religion. Civil officials
issue marriage licenses, and civil courts adjudicate divorces and rule on custody, property distribution, and the like. Covenant marriage proponents
are not making the argument that the state should cede this authority to
religious tribunals so that civil courts no longer have jurisdiction in such
matters.
In the U.S. family law system, civil and religious authorities already share
jurisdiction over marriage to a degree. In contrast to some legal systems (like
France or the Netherlands), in the United States, religious leaders may perform
86 · Ethics of Recognizing Religious Family Law
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marriage ceremonies that will be recognized as civil marriages provided the
couples comply with civil formalities. Through this “simultaneously . . . secular
and . . . religious event,” which incorporates “unofficial law and norms into the
civil rite” and “reinforces the solemnity of the occasion,” the state might be said
to harness religious power for its own ends.48 On the other hand, if religious
leaders or couples do not comply with these civil formalities, the resulting
religious marriage generally will not have civil effects.49 This highlights the
status of religious marriage as independent of the secular government but also
carries risk for the participants in such a marriage. It shuts them off from the
protections of civil family law with respect to the incidents of marriage and
procedures for marital dissolution, property distribution, spousal support,
and the like.50
Within the United States, certain religious faiths (for example, Catholicism,
Judaism, and Islam, but notably not the Protestant traditions) have their own
system of courts that handle certain family matters.51 Parties to such proceedings already ask civil courts to enforce or decline to enforce religious marriage
contracts, divorce orders, arbitration agreements, and custody and support
orders.52 One motivating factor for the demand for “multi-tiered marriage”
might be the perception that such courts are failing at this task, either out of a
lack of understanding of the particular religious tradition at issue or out of an
overzealous view of separation of church and state. Some Islamic scholars, for
example, critique civil courts in the United States and Canada for ignorance
about Islamic traditions and for failure to adjudicate properly claims arising
from Islamic marriage contracts.53 But these analyses generally call for civil
courts to do a better job when they confront Islamic family law, rather than
to cede authority to religious courts and cease exercising jurisdiction over
family law.54 Thus, a participant in the Multi-tiered Marriage Project, Mohammad Fadel, asserts that Muslims have a “keen interest” in a pluralistic system
of family law but concludes that “orthodox Muslims’ interests in family law
pluralism are better served through marginal reforms to the current family law
regime” than by “more robust proposals that would award religious institutions greater jurisdiction over family life.”55 Notably, in the recent controversy
in Ontario over so-called “Sharia arbitration” of family law, many Muslim
groups stressed the religious obligation of Muslims to obey civil authority
and urged that any religious arbitration should be subject to proper civil
law norms.56
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The demand for a more “robust” millet system in the United States, therefore, is not evident. What is evident is that some religious groups seek greater
congruence between civil and religious family law. Others seek greater accommodation of or at least appreciation by civil courts of religious law.
A complicating factor in considering calls for congruence between civil and
religious marriage is that although civil marriage, as distinct from religious
marriage, is in a sense a creature of state law and regulation,57 America’s history reveals the strong influence of Christian conceptions of marriage on the
secular law.58 As the late Lee Teitelbaum observed, “For most of American
history, . . . the law of marriage was consistent with and supported — if not
created — by the views of dominant religious communities.”59 The incompatibility of polygamy with Western, Christian understandings of marriage
animated governmental campaigns against Mormons and Native Americans.
Thus, “to the extent that the majority faith communities were oppositional, it
was to value sets that argued for change in the formation of families,” whether
it be polygamy in the nineteenth century or, in the late twentieth, the values
of secular humanism.60 Even today, as Estin observes, although U.S. family law
is thought to be secular and universal, traces of its religious roots are apparent in aspects of the law of marriage and divorce, which may look Christian,
exclusive, or sectarian to people of other faiths.61
Once again, the issue of same-sex marriage is a crucible for sorting out marriage’s dual status. Some religious authorities and lawmakers oppose extending
marriage to same-sex couples because such a redefinition would be contrary
to “millennia” of cultural and religious tradition as well as to the created
order.62 However, a dissenting theological view is that insisting on congruence by calling for a national definition of marriage risks “reifying marriage
as a legal, rather than religious, construct” and concedes to the state — rather
than religious traditions — the power to say what marriage is.63
I will not attempt to resolve this theological debate about congruence. I
believe that, notwithstanding the religious roots of contemporary civil law,
distinguishing religious and civil marriage is necessary to clarify government’s
interest in recognizing and regulating marriage. Indeed, state legislatures and
governors that have opened up civil marriage to same-sex couples stress this
distinction as they declare support both for equality in — that is, equal access to — civil marriage and for protecting religious freedom.64 Making this
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distinction follows from constitutional principles and from liberal political
principles about the fact of reasonable moral pluralism and toleration of religious difference.65 Furthermore, the nature of civil marriage has evolved over
time. As Case observes, what “marriage licenses” today is quite different from
what it licensed in an earlier era, when marriage entailed a hierarchical set of
rights and duties of husband and wife (baron and feme) and the criminal law
prohibited non-marital, non-procreative, and non-heterosexual sexual expression.66 Today, much of that criminal law has given way to understandings of a
realm of constitutionally protected liberty and privacy. And, pursuant to the
transformation of family law spurred by the Supreme Court’s series of Equal
Protection rulings, the rights and obligations of civil marriage are stated in
gender-neutral terms. Spouses are much freer to choose how to live their
marital life, and the rules of exit are far less strict.67
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Tensions between Civil and Religious Law:
Gender Roles and Gender Equality
What civil marriage licenses is at odds with at least some religious conceptions
of marriage. Considerations of a more pluralistic approach to legal regulation
should attend to these possible tension points. One example is sex equality and
gender roles in the family. Contemporary family law rejects the common law’s
model of husbandly rule and wifely obedience. Sex equality is also an important political value and constitutional principle.68 Civil family law’s model of
equal spousal and parental rights and responsibilities may be in tension with
religious conceptions of proper gender ordering.
In the book American Religions and the Family: How Faith Traditions
Cope With Modernization and Democracy,69 nearly every religious tradition
examined includes a tenet that men are to exercise authority and leadership in the home (and, often, in the broader society) and that women have
special duties in the home including (in some traditions) submission to or
respect for male authority. In coping with modernization, religious leaders
and adherents confront how to reconcile such traditional religious beliefs
with contemporary American values about equality of the sexes and marriage as a partnership.70 Similarly, another recent book, Muslim Women in
America: The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today, identifies a central tension
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between support in Muslim cultural and religious traditions for male authority in the home and in society and “the general climate of American discourse
about equality and justice between the sexes,” including equal responsibility
and decision making in the family.71 (The fact that American social practice may vary from these ideals is not the point; the discourse and public
attitudes themselves serve as identifiable contrasts to religious and cultural
traditions.)
Religious communities have diverse responses to this challenge. Some religious traditions (for example, mainline Protestantism) have moved away
from teachings about male dominance and female submission, fixed gender roles, and the marital, nuclear family to more egalitarian and pluralistic
visions of marriage and family forms.72 In various religions, women — and
men — have engaged in efforts to generate less patriarchal interpretations of
religious texts and to critique subordinating practices that have been justified
by religious teaching. By contrast, some religious groups embrace traditional
gender roles as part of an “oppositional” stance to American culture and the
perceived weakening of family values.73 Various immigrant communities contrast the morals and family values of their own societies of origin favorably
with perceived American values, similar to how many religious conservatives
in America view feminism and challenges to traditional gender roles as part
of a longer litany of forces (for example, individualism and secularism) that
threaten strong families.74
Muslim communities in America illustrate this diversity of responses to
ideals of equality. On the one hand, “[m]uch of the contemporary discourse,
joined by both men and women, portrays the liberal Western model of ‘equality’ between the sexes as unrealistic, unnatural and leading ultimately to many
Western women trying to raise children alone and below the poverty level.”75
On the other, women and men attempt to “reinterpret Qur’anic texts that
seem to support male dominance over women, trying to argue that the justice
of God affirmed in the holy text cannot allow women to be subordinated in
any way to men.”76 Generational differences are also a relevant factor. One
study reports that “[y]oung Muslims in America struggle both to respect the
honor of the family and to break free of expectations it imposes on them.
Muslim girls are becoming more articulate about their own frustrations at
the double standards that their parents seem to apply to the girls and their
brothers.”77
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This diversity of views and these generational tensions are pertinent to the
proposal for multi-tiered marriage. They raise questions about how to define
and interpret religious family law and whose voice will prevail if there are
conflicting interpretations.
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Pluralism in U.S. Family Law:
Jurisdiction, Location, and Citizenship
Some likely tension points in moving to a multi-tiered marriage system may
be evident from reasoning by analogy from case law in the United States in
which courts already consider the relationship between civil and religious
family law and are asked to enforce terms of a religious marriage contract,
recognize a foreign or religious marriage or divorce, or assume jurisdiction
over child custody disputes. The case law suggests a certain capaciousness
already at work as courts have embraced pluralism to a degree. But it also
suggests important limiting principles about when courts will not and should
not cede authority to religious or foreign courts or apply religious family
law. At issue also are questions of how to relate membership and location in
particular communities to citizenship.78 In this chapter, I can discuss only
a handful of illustrative cases about marriage and divorce and must direct
readers elsewhere for a more complete survey of this body of multicultural
family law.79
Finding multiculturalism in the context of civil family law may come as
a surprise, even though, as Estin observes, it should not, given the religious
heterogeneity within the United States and the migration of people across
national borders.80 This “growing body of multicultural family law,” she concludes, demonstrates the potential to embrace both “a number of fundamentally different family law traditions” and “deeper values that structure and
constrain the process of accommodation,” such as “principles of due process,
nondiscrimination, and religious freedom” as well as family law’s “protective
policies.”81 Estin calls for courts and lawmakers to develop a framework for
a multicultural family law that would “allow individuals greater freedom to
express their cultural or religious identity and negotiate the consequences of
these commitments,” but also “protect the rights of individuals to full membership and participation in the larger political community.”82
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This twin focus on expressing identity and safeguarding rights captures
an important challenge posed to legal pluralism: how to provide space for
living according to and negotiating within the framework of religious law
while also ensuring that membership in the political community is a source
of entitlement and obligation that coexists with, and may put constraints
on, other forms of affiliation. Bringing a feminist perspective — indeed a
multicultural feminist perspective83 — to bear on this challenge may fortify
analysis.
Because Nichols proposes a robust millet system of religious courts with
civil government, upholding basic minimal guidelines, what civil courts have
done may not be a useful model for what religious tribunals would do. But
this case law is instructive on how civil family law’s concerns for procedural
and substantive fairness shape the accommodation now afforded to religious
law. Religious family law often has gender asymmetries in the rights and duties of husbands and wives (including the power to initiate a divorce) and of
fathers and mothers. Rules concerning the economic consequences of marriage and divorce also differ from the economic partnership model of civil
family law. How have civil courts handled these tensions between civil and
religious law?
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Civil Enforcement of Religious Marriage
Contracts and Religious Arbitration
Courts are sometimes asked to enforce — or to decline to enforce — terms
of marriage contracts entered into pursuant to Jewish or Islamic marriages.
In the instance of Jewish marriage contracts, these cases generally involve
seeking to enforce an agreement to submit to religious arbitration.84 This
case law should be put in context of a general trend in family law away from
hostility to premarital agreements about property distribution in the event
of divorce — on the public policy ground that such agreements encourage
divorce — to permitting parties to a marriage to make contracts with each
other, that is, to engage in private ordering. At the same time, these Jewish
and Islamic marriage contracts are not premarital agreements, although courts
sometimes mistakenly treat them as such.85
Another relevant trend in family law is to allow, and sometimes require,
arbitration and other alternatives to divorce litigation. However, there are
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limits to private ordering, rooted in process concerns and in substantive concerns about fairness or protection of vulnerable or dependent parties. When
private ordering also entails religious law, courts face additional questions
about whether enforcing such agreements excessively entangles a civil court
with religion, in contravention of the First Amendment.
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Religious Marriage Contracts, Religious Arbitration,
and the Get Statutes

A leading case for the proposition that a civil court may properly exercise
jurisdiction in an action arising out of a religious marriage contract is Avitzur
v. Avitzur.86 In that case, New York’s highest court held that secular terms of a
religious marriage contract, the Jewish ketubah, may be enforceable as a contractual obligation. Relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedents, the court said
it could apply “neutral principles of contract law” and need not consider religious doctrine.87 The specific contract term was an agreement to appear before
the beth din, a Jewish religious tribunal, to allow it to “advise and counsel the
parties” in matters concerning their marriage. The wife had already obtained
a civil divorce but, under Jewish law, would not be religiously divorced and
thus able to remarry and have legitimate children until her husband granted
her a Jewish divorce decree, a get.88
Jewish tradition refers to women whose husbands do not give them a
get as agunah, “a chained woman” (chained to the dead marriage).89 Jewish tradition has developed ways to address this problem, such as putting a
clause in the ketubah to agree to arbitration. Avitzur rationalized enforcing
such an agreement as simply compelling a husband “to perform a secular
obligation to which he contractually bound himself.”90 The New York legislature subsequently enacted two statutes aimed at addressing the plight of
the agunah.91
Nichols offers the get statutes as an example of multi-tiered marriage,92 but
I think Avitzur and these statutes could better be understood as an attempt
by civil government to remedy a disadvantage arising out of gender asymmetry in religious law that disproportionately affects religious women and
has troubling spillover effects in the civil realm, such as unequal bargaining
power and one-sided settlements.93 Broyde suggests that these statutes seek to
harmonize civil and religious divorce law, with the encouragement of religious
leaders, based on advancing the “purpose and function of the secular divorce
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law” — “ensuring that all of [New York’s] citizens are in fact free to remarry
after they receive a civil divorce.”94
Thus, civil law’s attempt to solve the get problem seems less an argument
for civil government ceding more authority to religious tribunals than for
shared or cooperative jurisdiction: religious and secular authorities cooperate to solve a problem that neither can solve entirely on its own.95 In this
volume, Minow argues that though some may see these statutes as an objectionable compromise because New York acknowledges the parallel existence of a religious legal system, New York actually aligns the two systems by
extending protection for religious women while holding fast to “its gender
equality norm.”96 Lisa Fishbayn Joffe’s analysis of Canada’s get statutes finds
a similar concern on the part of civil authority both to ameliorate disadvantages for religious women and to cooperate with religious authorities to solve
the problem.97
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Adjudication of Islamic Marriage Contracts: The Mahr

Scholars of Islamic family law describe the marriage contract as a protective
mechanism that affords a Muslim woman a chance to customize her marriage
through provisions that guarantee her rights with regard to her spouse (for
example, to work outside the home without her husband’s permission, to
initiate divorce, or not to clean the house). Many Muslim women, unaware
of their rights, underutilize this protective device.98
Some state courts (among them, New York) have enforced a wife’s right
in Islamic marriage contracts to mahr, a bridal gift or dower.99 Islamic traditions regarding whether a woman is entitled to mahr at divorce are complex
and differ based on who initiates divorce, the type of divorce at issue, and the
school of interpretation.100 Nonetheless, some civil courts have stated that the
fact that these contracts were entered into in the context of Islamic religious
ceremonies does not render them unenforceable.
An illustrative case is Odatalla v. Odatalla.101 In this case, a New Jersey court
rejected the husband’s argument that the court could not order specific performance of his obligation to pay $10,000 in postponed dower because (1) the
First Amendment doctrine of separation of church and state precluded a civil
court’s review of the agreement and (2) the agreement was not a valid contract
under New Jersey law. Instead, the court ruled that it could specifically enforce
terms of the agreement, which was entered into during an Islamic marriage
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ceremony. The court reasoned that the agreement could be enforced “based
upon ‘neutral principles of law’ and not on religious policy or theories.”102
Applying those neutral principles, the court held that the agreement had the
elements of a valid contract.103 Rejecting the husband’s argument that the term
“postponed” made the contract too vague, the court found persuasive the
wife’s offer of testimony concerning Islamic custom in which the sum could
be demanded by the wife at any time, although it usually is not unless there is
a death of the husband or a divorce.104 The court also suggests that interpreting the demands of the First Amendment requires attending to the contrast
between the more religiously homogenous community of the late 1700s “when
our Constitution was drafted” and the more religiously and ethnically diverse
“community we live in today.”105
A Florida appellate court, in Akileh v. Elchahal,106 similarly looked to New
York precedents and to testimony about Islamic law to uphold a husband’s
agreement in an Islamic marriage contract to pay his wife a “postponed dowry”
of $50,000. The wife demanded payment in a divorce proceeding brought in
civil court. The court concluded that the sadaq, the postponed dowry incorporated into the couple’s marriage certificate when they married in Florida in a
Moslem ceremony, could be enforced using principles of Florida contract law.
The court heard four witnesses, including Islamic experts, as to the meaning
of sadaq, and was persuaded that the parties understood the sadaq’s protective function and that the wife’s right to receive it was not negated if she filed
for divorce.
Some courts, by contrast, have declined to enforce the obligation to pay
mahr. One ground has been that although in principle such an obligation
could be enforced by a civil court, a particular contract failed to satisfy general
contract principles such as stating the material terms of the agreement.107 An
alternate ground for nonenforcement, under contract principles, illustrated
in a recent Ohio appellate decision, is that the husband “entered into the marriage contract as a result of overreaching or coercion.” Analogizing to case law
concerning when a prenuptial agreement will be invalid, the court noted that
the husband did not have a chance to consult an attorney, was presented with
the agreement just a few hours before the ceremony, and signed only because
he was “embarrassed and stressed.”108
A different ground is that the mahr agreement offends public policy because
it provides an incentive for the wife to seek divorce. In Dajani v. Dajani,109 the
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California court declined, on public policy grounds, to enforce a foreign proxy
marriage contract (entered into in Jordan) involving an Islamic dower agreement under which the husband was obliged to pay the balance of the wife’s
dowry either when the marriage was dissolved or the husband died. The court
bypassed the conflicting expert testimony over whether or not the husband
had an obligation to pay if the wife initiated the divorce and, analogizing the
contract to a premarital agreement, ruled that it “clearly provided for [the]
wife to profit by a divorce.”110
The court found “apt” the rationale of the earlier California case, In re the
Marriage of Noghrey,111 in which the court declined on public policy grounds to
enforce an agreement entered into before a Jewish religious ceremony that the
husband would give his wife a house and $500,000 or “one-half of my assets,
whichever is greater, in the event of a divorce.” The Dajani court noted that,
in Noghrey, the protective function of the ketubah — to discourage divorce
by making it costly for the husband and to provide economic security for the
wife because the husband “could apparently divorce his wife at will” — did not
matter to the holding.112 In effect, both the ketubah term in Noghrey and the
Islamic dower agreement in Dajani encouraged divorce “by providing wife
with cash and property in the event the marriage failed.”113
These cases raise difficult questions about how civil courts should grapple
with a religious tradition’s protective devices adopted in light of vulnerabilities that women face due to gender asymmetry in religious law and broader
cultural norms. For example, in Noghreyi, the wife testified that this economic
protection was necessary because “it is hard for an Iranian woman to remarry
after a divorce because she is no longer a virgin.”114 She testified that in return
for the agreement, she gave the groom “assurances that she was a virgin and
was medically examined for that purpose.”115 Like Estin, I wonder if the courts
in these cases were too inattentive to this protective function and whether
they couldn’t find an analogy to protective measures of U.S. divorce law. 116
Furthermore, as some Muslim scholars point out, had the Dajani court not
taken such a “superficial” approach to Islamic law, it might have recognized
that its “profiteering” assumptions about mahr did not apply uniformly to the
rules about the wife’s entitlement to mahr.117
In some recent cases, judges seem comfortable handling claims based on
Islamic marriage contracts and capable of making fine distinctions when
necessary. For example, in a Texas case, Ahmed v. Ahmed, an appellate court
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considered a trial court ruling that the husband’s agreement, in a nikah nama,
Islamic marriage certificate, to pay a deferred mahr of $50,000 was a martial contract executed in contemplation of a forthcoming marriage and was
a “valid, binding, and enforceable contract” under the Texas statutory law
governing premarital agreements.118 On appeal, the husband argued that the
mahr agreement could not be enforced as a premarital agreement because
the parties were already married in a civil ceremony six months before the
religious ceremony and “the terms of the mahr agreement are too vague and
uncertain to be enforced,” because he could not understand his obligation
under the contract. The appellate court agreed with his first argument and
rejected the wife’s argument that the date of the religious ceremony controlled:
“if the legal requirements for a ceremonial marriage are satisfied, Texas does
not distinguish between civil and religious marriage ceremonies.” Thus, the
parties were spouses, not “prospective spouses,” at the time they signed the
mahr agreement.119 The former wife argued in the alternative that the mahr
agreement could be enforced as a “postmarital partition and exchange agreement” under other provisions of Texas’s family law statutes.
The court rejected the husband’s second argument, finding that the agreement was “sufficiently specific.” It looked to “the relationship between the
parties and the circumstances surrounding the contract” on this question. Both
parties “were raised in the Islamic faith”; the former wife testified that “the
mahr agreement is a contract based on Islamic custom and religious principles,”
a promise of an amount to be paid to the bride and must be paid at the time of
a divorce, if not given before. Husband offered no testimony, and the reviewing
court noted that if wife’s testimony were credited by the trial court, then the
evidence established that the parties understood the agreement and that the
terms were sufficiently specific enough to be enforced.120 However, wife faced
a further hurdle because of failure to meet other statutory requirements for a
partition and exchange agreement. Nonetheless, the court exercised its “broad
discretion” to remand because “it serves the interest of justice to allow [the
wife] another opportunity on remand to prove that the mahr agreement is
enforceable on grounds other than as a premarital agreement, be it a partition
and exchange agreement or otherwise” — theories of enforcement not fully
explored in the earlier proceedings.121
Another interesting feature of some recent case law is that it is not always
the husband who seeks to thwart the relief a wife obtains in civil court. Nor,
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in the case of a migratory couple, is it always the husband who is more acclimated and economically successful in the United States. For example, in Mir
v. Birjandi, an Ohio appellate court considered the wife’s argument that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a divorce because, while the civil case,
initiated by the husband, was pending in Ohio, she obtained a divorce in an
Iranian court.122 She argued that the Ohio court erred in awarding her husband
spousal support, challenged the court’s division of marital assets, and argued
that it abused its discretion in “ordering her to return the $17,000 mahr that
[husband] paid to her in order to obtain a release from Iran,” where he was
allegedly detained (after traveling there) due to the wife’s divorce proceedings
initiated in Iran.
The couple married in Iran in 1982 but soon immigrated to the United
States. The wife earned a PhD in engineering and worked for a military technology institute. The husband, an agriculture engineer in Iran, had difficulty
finding work in his field in the United States, due to his poor English skills.
He worked as a tow truck driver and taxi driver to support the family. By the
time of divorce, the wife earned “substantially more income.”123
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Iranian divorce
decree was not binding on the court. The wife argued, with respect to the
order that she pay her ex-husband spousal support for ten years, that the court
wrongly imputed income to her based on her prior income although she quit
her job during the course of the trial. Testimony suggested she would not have
been renewed in her current job because of poor performance and difficulty
getting security clearance due to her dual citizenship. The trial court did not
elaborate reasons for the award but apparently based it on the fact that the
husband’s income was $18,200 per year, while the wife’s was $118,000–120,000.
It did not credit her testimony that medical conditions prevented her from
working. On appeal, the court concluded that the trial court could reasonably
have concluded that the husband, who soon after filing for divorce had moved
to a new city, was “not capable of earning substantially more income,” while
the wife “was capable of finding another engineering position” in which she
would have earnings comparable to her previous job.
With respect to the issue of mahr, the court noted, “In Iran, mahr is money
paid to the bride by the groom or his family for the financial protection of
the bride in case of divorce.”124 The court noted the husband’s testimony
that he paid the mahr in Iran (using his credit cards) because he was not
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allowed to leave the country unless he did so. The reviewing court found
no error in crediting the husband for this payment as part of the division of
marital assets.
Notably, the reviewing court upheld the ruling that the wife pay the husband’s attorney’s fees and costs, stressing the inequality of their economic
positions and her misconduct in the litigation process. She had all the marital
assets in her name; during the divorce process, he “was forced to live on credit
cards, low-wage employment, and charity.” Implicitly, the court was critical of
her resort to the Iranian forum, which required him to incur credit card debt
to secure release from Iran.125
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Resolving Conflicts between Civil and
Religious Divorce Law: Two Contrasting Cases
How would a modern millet system handle clashes between civil and religious
laws concerning the process due when spouses seek to divorce each other? Or
concerning whether divorcing spouses have a right to support or to equitable
distribution of property? Would civil family law’s protective rules be part of
a “minimum” insisted upon by civil law, or would private ordering prevail?
For example, in Islamic family law, husband and wife generally maintain their
separate property, and unless the contract specifies, there is no presumption
of property division.126 This contrasts with notions in civil family law either
of community property during marriage and equal or equitable division of
such property at divorce (in community property states) or, in common law
states, of deferred community property in the form of equitable distribution
at divorce.
To explore these questions and to illustrate how challenging questions
about the interplay of religious and civil law intertwine with geographical
location, family mobility, and citizenship, I will discuss two contrasting cases.
In Chaudry v. Chaudry,127 the wife filed suit in a New Jersey civil court for
separate maintenance and child support, alleging unjustified abandonment by
her husband. The husband’s defense was that he had obtained a valid divorce
in Pakistan in accordance with Pakistani law. Both husband and wife were
Pakistani citizens; the wife and children resided in Pakistan (but had lived
in the United States for a few years early in the marriage), and the husband
resided and practiced medicine in New Jersey.
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The appellate court held there was not an “adequate nexus” between the
marriage and the state of New Jersey to justify a New Jersey court awarding
the wife alimony or equitable distribution. Second, it saw “no reason of public
policy” not to interpret and enforce the marriage contract in accordance with
the law of Pakistan, “where it was freely negotiated and the marriage took
place.”128 Expert testimony established that alimony “does not exist under
Pakistan law” and that providing for it by contract is “void as a matter of law”
in Pakistan. Conversely, the agreement could have given the wife an interest
in her husband’s property, but it did not.
Had there been a sufficient nexus, the court observed, a New Jersey court
could consider a claim for alimony or equitable distribution, even though such
relief could not be obtained in the state or country granting a divorce. Location
is of obvious significance for jurisdiction. The wife’s insufficient connection
to the state of New Jersey (evidently due in part to husband’s conduct) barred
relief. Husband and wife remained citizens of Pakistan, and expert testimony
indicated that such citizenship was a “sufficient basis” for a divorce judgment
in Pakistan. In concluding that the lower court should have applied comity to
recognize the decree, the reviewing court stressed, “The need for predictability
and stability in status relationships requires no less.”129
An instructive example of when such a nexus does exist, also involving the
law of Pakistan and a mobile family, is Aleem v. Aleem.130 There, a Maryland
appellate court upheld a lower court’s ruling that it need not give comity to
a Pakistani talaq divorce and was not barred from ruling that a wife receive
equitable distribution of her husband’s pension. The appellate ruling was affirmed by Maryland’s highest court. This case illustrates how migration gives
rise to jurisdictional questions and the possibility of forum shopping. The
husband, at age twenty-nine, and wife, eighteen, married in Pakistan after
their families arranged a meeting. They never lived together in Pakistan and
had been living in Maryland over twenty years at the time the wife initiated
a civil divorce proceeding. They had two children, both born in the United
States and U.S. citizens.
When the wife filed for divorce, the husband moved to dismiss on the
ground that “all issues have already been decided in Pakistan.” He referred
to the parties’ marriage contract, entered into in Pakistan, which called for a
deferred dowry of about $2,500 U.S. dollars. He also informed the court that
subsequent to the wife filing her action, he obtained a talaq divorce at the
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Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C., by pronouncing three times that
he divorced his wife. The wife was served with the “Divorce Decree” and an
attached notice from the “Union Council” about whether the parties wanted
to reconcile.
The lower court declined to give comity to the divorce, stating that it “offends the notions of this Court in terms of how a divorce is granted.”131 On
appeal, Maryland’s highest court (the Court of Appeals of Maryland) invoked
Maryland’s Equal Rights Amendment to indicate that “a foreign talaq divorce
provision, . . . where only the male, i.e., husband, has an independent right to
utilize talaq and the wife may utilize it only with the husband’s permission, is
contrary to Maryland’s constitutional provisions and . . . to the public policy
of Maryland.”132 Moreover, allowing such strategic forum shopping by the
husband would defeat civil law’s protective purposes if the process to which a
wife would be entitled under state law would be denied to her:
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A husband who is a citizen of any country in which Islamic law, adopted as the
civil law, prevails could go to the embassy of that country and perform talaq,
and divorce her (without prior notice to her) long before she would have any
opportunity to fully litigate, under Maryland law, the circumstances of the
parties’ dissolution of their marriage.133

Thus, public policy — including concern for due process — justified denial of
comity to the foreign divorce.
The conflict between Maryland’s and Pakistan’s rules concerning post-
divorce property distribution afforded the ground for a second ruling: that,
as a form of spousal support, the husband must pay his wife 50 percent of his
monthly pension benefit until the death of either party. The husband argued
that by virtue of the marriage contract and governing Pakistani law, his wife
was not entitled to any portion of his pension. Both reviewing courts upheld
the pension award and concluded that because Pakistani statutes were in
conflict with Maryland’s public policy about property distribution, comity
should be denied.134 Under Pakistani law, the “default” was that the wife had
no rights to property titled in husband’s name, while under Maryland law,
the “default” is that she has such rights.135 The Court of Special Appeals also
cautioned against equating the Pakistani marriage contract with “a premarital
or post-marital agreement that validly relinquished, under Maryland law,
rights in marital property.”136
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The location of the family anchored the judicial assertion that “it is clear
that this State has a sufficient nexus with the marriage to effect an equitable
distribution of marital property.”137 By contrast to the facts in Chaudry, in
Aleem the court noted the couple’s long residence in Maryland, the birth and
rearing of their children in Maryland, and the permanent resident status of
the wife, who sought the equitable distribution. Nor was there any plausible
basis for Pakistani personal jurisdiction over the wife with respect to the talaq
divorce. The decisions in Aleem express a public policy against strategic forum
shopping, which would allow a domiciliary, while continuing that domicile,
to seek to “‘avoid the incidents of his domiciliary law and to deprive the other
party to the marriage of her rights under that law’” and of due process by
traveling elsewhere to invoke another state’s jurisdiction.138
This point about the link between the protections, benefits, and obligations
of civil marriage and domicile seems important to a consideration of marriage
pluralism in which a religious tribunal might not be in another country, but
within the territorial boundaries of the state of which the party is a resident.
How might this concern for strategic exploitation of nationality and of favorable religious law apply in a millet system within the United States? Would
a new system of personal law mean that persons, no matter where they were
located as citizens or resident aliens, would carry on their backs the religious
law applicable to them? Would this regime resemble the legal pluralism of
an earlier Europe, of which a ninth-century bishop observed that “[i]t often
happened that five men were present or setting together, and not one of them
had the same law as another”?139
One criticism of the traditional millet system and of its contemporary vestiges is the lack of choice in jurisdiction. One’s religious affiliation determines
the religious court to which one may go. In a more contemporary system of
legal pluralism, to what extent would people who are members of religious
communities have rights, in terms of being free to leave that community or
to stay but seek the protection of civil law? When adults exercise those exit
rights, what is the impact on the rights of their children? Thus, one critical
question is how robust legal pluralism would reconcile civil law’s commitments
to equal parental rights and responsibilities with religious law systems that
have asymmetrical treatment of the rights of fathers and mothers. Shachar
proposes that what is needed is a form of multiple jurisdiction that attempts
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to respect membership in religious communities as well as rights of citizenship
and resists affording religious tribunals a monopoly.140 These concerns indicate
the challenges of finding a useful model of contemporary legal pluralism.
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International Models? Assessing Jurisdictional
Pluralism through a Gender Equality Lens
Training a gender lens on the comparative enterprise the Multi-tiered Marriage
Project proposes would better inform the national conversation it invites. A
significant body of feminist work identifies problems of gender inequality and
discrimination in legal systems that cede jurisdiction to religious tribunals or
apply religious and customary family law. As Helen Irving’s comparative study
of constitutional design concludes, when women have participated in the process of constitution making in societies adopting new constitutions, they have
“consistently asked” for constitutional equality and full citizenship, including
“the supremacy of the constitution over tradition and custom, including over
customary laws that perpetuate subordination.”141 In another comparative
work on gender and constitutions, Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin,
speaking of Israel, India, and South Africa (three of Nichols’s examples), note
that governmental decisions “to recognize customary or religious jurisdiction
over certain relationships, often including those which are the most intimate
and intense, such as marriage, divorce, custody, property, and succession,”
have been of particular concern to feminists.142 In that volume, Shachar and
comparative constitutional law scholar Ran Hirschl argue, “A major obstacle to
establishing women’s full participation as equals in all spheres of life in Israel . . .
continues to be the intersection of gender and religious/national tensions.”143
Israel’s contemporary millet system, they contend elsewhere, grants religious
communities “a license to maintain intragroup practices that disproportionately injure vulnerable group members, such as women,” for example, through
“gender discrimination in the religious divorce process.”144 To afford redress,
Israel has made recent efforts “to enforce secular and gender egalitarian norms
over the exercise of religious tribunals.”145 In the constitution-building process
of various nations, bringing constitutional commitments to sex equality to
bear on family law has been viewed as a sign of progressive change.146 Frances
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Raday argues that human rights norms of women’s equality are translated into
a “normative paradigm,” within states, in such constitutional law, although
there is often a clash between these norms and “traditionalist religion and
culture, especially as they bear on family law.”147
As the ongoing debate about accommodation of multiculturalism reveals,
“the status of women in distinct cultural communities” is often at stake because “[w]omen and their bodies are the symbolic-cultural site upon which
human societies inscript their moral bodies.”148 Calls to preserve religious
or cultural autonomy often target the family and women’s roles as core features that must be preserved, even as other aspects of religion and culture
adapt to modernization.149 In response, some women and women’s groups
(such as Women Living under Muslim Laws) contest patriarchal interpretations of culture and religion and reveal the actual diversity of religious
laws and customs and the possibility for greater equality within particular
traditions.150
If civil government is to cede authority to religious tribunals, who within
the religious tradition has authority to say what constitutes religious law, and
what room will there be for dissenting voices that contest the most patriarchal
interpretations of religious family law?151 A millet system that relegates religious women to the primary or exclusive jurisdiction of religious tribunals is
not likely to facilitate such dissent, by contrast to a jurisdictional model that
attempts to secure women’s rights both as members of religious communities
and as citizens. Shachar proposes a form of “multicultural feminism” that
“treats women as both culture-bearers and rights-bearers.”152 It is attentive to
the risks to women’s rights to equality and full citizenship that arise both from
privatizing family law (e.g., through such devices as private arbitration) and
from granting public and binding authority to religious codes. These risks
inform my own concerns about developing a millet system in the United States.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for greater attention to how the interplay
between civil and religious jurisdiction over family law bears on women’s
equality. I have contrasted two possible strategies for giving more voice to
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religious models of marriage: securing congruence between religious and
civil law by instantiating religious law in civil law or recognizing the binding
authority of religious tribunals to adjudicate family law. I have concluded
that the call for multi-tiered marriage, or a “robust” modern millet system,
in the United States should be resisted. Normative pluralism is indeed everywhere, including in the “unofficial” family law that shapes many people’s
lives. Translating this into more legal pluralism, however, warrants concern.
U.S. courts already give official, or civil, effect to certain aspects of religious
family law. But they also decline to do so based on certain limiting principles rooted in concerns for due process and for the substance of civil family law’s commitments and to broader legal and political principles of sex
equality.
Civil law’s concerns for gender equality and for protecting vulnerable parties are salient reasons to be cautious about new forms of legal pluralism.
Any system of “multi-tiered marriage” that does not attend adequately to
the equal protection and equal citizenship of women as well as men conflicts
with the commitments of the U.S. family law system and constitutional principles. Moreover, lending the state’s imprimatur to models of family based on
male authority and female submission or on other forms of gender privilege
and preference may educate children as to the legitimacy of those models
in broader society. This implicates the state’s interest in children as future
citizens. What is needed is a model of legal pluralism that holds fast both
to the value of religious membership and to the rights and duties of equal
citizenship.
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